The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas

Theory and Decision

Volumn 63, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 1-40

  Lehtinen, Aki ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

Author keywords

Agendas; Counterbalancing; Simulation; Strategic voting; Welfare

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; COMPUTER SIMULATION; CORRELATION METHODS; SOCIAL ASPECTS; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

COUNTERBALANCING; STRATEGIC VOTING;

DECISION MAKING;

EID: 34250867016     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: 15737187     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-007-9028-4     Document Type: Article

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