Voting rules, manipulability and social homogeneity

Public Choice

Volumn 116, Issue 1-2, 2003, Pages 165-184

  Lepelley, Dominique ^a   Valognes, Fabrice ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE CAEN   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DU HAVRE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038463682     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1024221816507     Document Type: Review

References (15)

1. Aleskerov, F. and Kurbanov, E. (1999). Degree of manipulability of know social choice procedures. In Alkan, A., Aliprantis, C.D. and Yannelis, N.C. (Eds.), Current trends in economics, 13-27. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
2. Berg, S. (1985). Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity. Public Choice 47: 377-387.
3. Favardin, P., Lepelley, D. and Serais, S. (2001). Borda rule, Copeland method, and strategic manipulation. Review of Economic Design (forthcoming).
4. Gehrlein, W.V. (1982). Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules. Mathematical Social Sciences 2: 123-130.
5. Gehrlein, W.V. (1995). Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity. In Barnett, W.A., Moulin, H., Salles, M. and Schofield, N.J. (Eds.), Social choice, welfare and ethics, 127-143. Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press.
6. Gehrlein, W.V. and Lepelley, D. (2001). The Condorcet efficiency of Borda rule with anonymous voters. Mathematical Social Sciences 41: 39-50.
7. Gibbard, A.F. (1973). Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. Econometrica 41: 587-601.
8. Guilbaud, G.T. (1952). Les théories de l'intérêt général et le problème logique de l'agrégation. Economie Appliquée 5: 501-584.
9. Kelly, J.S. (1993), Almost social choice rules are highly manipulable, but few aren't. Social Choice and Welfare 10: 161-175.
10. Kim, K.H. and Roush, F.W. (1996). Statistical manipulability of social choice functions. Group Decision and Negotiation 5: 263-282.
11. Lepelley, D. and Mbih, B. (1994). The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences. Social Choice and Welfare 11: 253-265.
12. Lepelley, D. and Valognes, F. (1999). On the Kim and Roush voting procedure. Group Decision and Negotiation 8: 109-123.
13. Nitzan, S. (1985). The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation. Public Choice 47: 349-370.
14. Satterthwaite, M.A. (1975), Strategyproofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondences for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory 10: 187-217.
15. Smith, D.A. (1999). Manipulability measures of common social choice functions. Social Choice and Welfare 16: 639-661.