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Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 455-468

Probabilistic Borda rule voting

(1) Heckelman, Jac C a

a WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242627496 PISSN: 01761714 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0211-4 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (18)

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