Unsettling aspects of voting theory

Economic Theory

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 529-555

  Saari, Donald G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Monotonicity; Noshow paradox; Positional voting; Strategic voting; Voting paradoxes

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242641598     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0332-5     Document Type: Article

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