Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 227, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 299-314

  Ohtsuki, Hisashi ^a  

^a KYUSHU UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Adaptive dynamics; Indirect reciprocity; Reputation; Stochastic strategy

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTION; RECIPROCITY; STOCHASTICITY;

ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR; ARTICLE; BIODIVERSITY; DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS; EVOLUTIONARY ADAPTATION; INDIVIDUAL BASED POPULATION MODEL; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SOCIETY; STOCHASTIC MODEL; THEORETICAL MODEL;

ALTRUISM; ANIMALS; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 1542358799     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2003.11.008     Document Type: Article

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