Executive compensation, firm performance, and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from new panel data

Pacific Basin Finance Journal

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 36-55

  Kato, Takao ^a,b,c   Kim, Woochan ^d   Lee, Ju Ho ^d  

^a Assistant Professor in the University Libraries   (United States)

^b The Sanford C Bernstein Co Center for Leadership and Ethics   (United States)

^c IZA   (Germany)

^d Korea Development Institute   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Chaebols; Corporate governance; Executive compensation; Firm performance; Korea

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845869040     PISSN: 0927538X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2006.03.004     Document Type: Article

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