Executive Salaries as Tournament Prizes and Executive Bonuses as Managerial Incentives in Japan

Journal of the Japanese and International Economies

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 319-346

  Xu, Peng ^a  

^a HOSEI UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038877207     PISSN: 08891583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jjie.1997.0373     Document Type: Article

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