Negotiating environmental agreements: Regional or federal authority?

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 1-24

  Eckert, Heather ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Delegation; Federation; International environmental agreements; Jurisdiction; Nash bargaining

Indexed keywords

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; POLLUTION; PUBLIC POLICY; REGULATORY COMPLIANCE;

POLLUTANTS;

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; NEGOTIATION PROCESS; POLLUTION CONTROL; STRATEGIC APPROACH;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 0038679602     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0095-0696(02)00029-3     Document Type: Article

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