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Volumn 23, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 266-283

Delegation and Threat in Bargaining

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EID: 0013275709     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0611     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (66)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.