Structural reform litigation: Remedial bargaining and bureaucratic drift

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 159-183

  Bertelli, Anthony M ^a   Feldmann, Sven E ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c Ctr for Economic and Bus Research   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Agency; Bargaining; Bureaucratic drift; Enforcement; Public law

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645034125     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: 14603667     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629806061859     Document Type: Review

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