Optimal central bank design: Benchmarks for the ECB

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 1, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 207-235

  Berger, Helge ^a,b  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

^b CESIFO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Central bank design; ECB; ECB reform; Eurosystem; Federal central banks

Indexed keywords

EID: 33747247515     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-006-8344-8     Document Type: Article

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