A (Critical) appraisal of the ecb’s voting reform

Intereconomics

Volumn 38, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 129-131

  Meade, Ellen E ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33747319111     PISSN: 00205346     EISSN: 1613964X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF03031763     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. The current 12 countries, plus Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and ten accession countries in eastern Europe (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic and SIovenia).
2. Charles Wyplosz: Briefing Notes to the Committee for Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, February 2003.
3. The Fed uses a rotation system to allocate votes so that only 12 of the 19 officials have voting rights at any given meeting.
4. Alan S. Blinder, John Morgan: Are Two Heads Better Than One?: An Experimental Analysis of Group vs. Individual Decisionmaking, Working Paper No. 7909, 2000, NBER.
5. One voting seat is rotated among: Cleveland and Chicago
6. Atlanta, Dallas, and St. Louis
7. Boston, Philadelphia, and Richmond
8. Kansas City, Minneapolis, and San Francisco.
9. Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs: Report on the proposal for a Council decision on an amendment to Article 10.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank, European Parliament, March 2003, p. 10. TFor a proposal of this sort see Peter Bofinger: Consequences of the modification of the Governing Council rules, Briefing paper for the European Parliament, February 2003
10. Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs: Report on the proposal for a Council decision on an amendment to Article 10.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank, European Parliament, March 2003, p. 10. TFor a proposal of this sort see Peter Bofinger: Consequences of the modification of the Governing Council rules, Briefing paper for the European Parliament, February 2003
11. European Commission: Commission Opinion, February 19, 2003
12. Daniel Gros: Reforming the composition of the ECB Governing Council in view of enlargement: How not to do it!, Briefing paper for the European Parliament, February 2003
13. Charles Wyplosz: Fiscal Policy in EMU: Rules or Institutions?, paper prepared for the Group of Economic Analysis of the European Commission, April 2002.