Do asymmetries matter for European monetary policy?

European Economic Review

Volumn 46, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 443-469

  Aksoy, Yunus ^a   De Grauwe, Paul ^a   Dewachter, Hans ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

EMU; Linear feedback rules; Monetary stability

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; INFLATION; INTEREST RATE; MONETARY POLICY; WELFARE IMPACT;

EUROPE;

EID: 0036190127     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00160-X     Document Type: Article

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