The Bundesbank's path to independence: Evidence from the 1950s

Public Choice

Volumn 93, Issue 3-4, 1997, Pages 427-453

  Berger, Helge ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031320280     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1004928828323     Document Type: Article

References (65)

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