Federal monetary policy

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 105, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 643-659

  Hefeker, Carsten ^a  

^a Hamburgisches Welt Wirtschafts Archiv   (Germany)

Author keywords

Federalism; Monetary policy; Monetary union

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; METHODOLOGY; MONETARY POLICY; MONETARY UNION;

EID: 0348167843     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2003.00007.x     Document Type: Article

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