The effect of communication in incentive systems - An experimental study

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 333-353

  Harbring, Christine ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33747054760     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/mde.1266     Document Type: Article

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