Why labour market experiments?

Labour Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 399-406

  Falk, Armin ^a   Fehr, Ernst ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Experiments; Labour economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038309606     PISSN: 09275371     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0927-5371(03)00050-2     Document Type: Article

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