The Binary Additivity of Subjective Probability Does not Indicate the Binary Complementarity of Perceived Certainty

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Volumn 81, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 195-225

  Windschitl, Paul D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009153855     PISSN: 07495978     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/obhd.1999.2876     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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