False memories of the future: A critique of the applications of probabilistic reasoning to the study of cognitive processes

Psychological Review

Volumn 109, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 358-375

  Moldoveanu, Mihnea ^a   Langer, Ellen ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COGNITION; DEFENSE MECHANISM; HUMAN; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL; REVIEW; STATISTICAL MODEL;

COGNITION; HUMANS; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; MODELS, STATISTICAL; REPRESSION;

EID: 85047675094     PISSN: 0033295X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/0033-295X.109.2.358     Document Type: Article

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