Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 318-336

  Schmitz, Patrick W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 25144524808     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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