Mechanism sufficient statistic in the risk-neutral agency problem

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 154, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 622-639

  Demougin, Dominique ^a   Fluet, Claude ^b  

^a OTTO VON GUERICKE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032219118     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. BARON, D. and D. BESANKO [1984], "Regulation Asymmetric Information and Auditing," The Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 447-470.
2. BLACKWELL, D. [1951], "Comparison of Experiments," in: J. Neyman (ed.), Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, University of California Press: Berkeley.
3. -[1953], "Equivalent Comparison of Experiments," Annals of Mathematics and Statistics, 24, 265-272.
4. GJESDAL, J. [1982], "Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem," Review of Economic Studies, 49, 373-390.
5. GOURIEROUX, C. and A. MONTFORT [1995], Statistics and Econometric Methods, Cambridge University Press: New York.
6. GROSSMAN, S. and O. HART [1983], "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, 51, 7-45.
7. HOLMSTRÖM, B. [1979], "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 74-91.
8. JEWITT, I. [1988], "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, 56, 1177-1190.
9. KIM, S. K. [1995], "Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Problem," Econometrica, 63, 89-102.
10. LAFFONT, J.-J. and J. TIROLE [1993], The Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
11. MILGROM, P. [1981], "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, 12, 380-391.
12. MIRRLEES, J. [1974], "Notes on Welfare Economics, Information and Uncertainty," pp. 243-258 in: M. Balch, D. McFadden and S. Wu (eds.), Essays on Economic Behavior Under Uncertainty, North-Holland: Amsterdam.
13. PARK, E. S. [1995], "Incentive Contracting Under Limited Liability," Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 4, 477-490.
14. ROGERSON, W. [1985], "The First Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, 53, 1357-1368.
15. SINCLAIR-DESGAGNÉ, B. [1994], "The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, 62, 459-466.