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Economics Letters
Volumn 61, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 251-259
Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining
Author keywords

Bargaining; L14; L20; Limited Liability; Moral Hazard
Indexed keywords

EID: 0032343862     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00141-4     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (34)
References (14)
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    • Mookherjee, D., 1997. Informational rents and property rights in land. In: Roemer, J.E. (Ed.), Property relations, incentives and welfare: Proceedings of a conference held in Barcelona, Spain, by the International Economic Association, IEA Conference Volume, no. 115. St. Martin's Press, New York, Macmillan Press, London, in association with the International Economic Association.
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.