Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature

Public Choice

Volumn 124, Issue 1-2, 2005, Pages 135-156

  Stratmann, Thomas ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 24144483712     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-4750-3     Document Type: Article

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