What do candidates maximize (and why should anyone care)?

Public Choice

Volumn 109, Issue 1-2, 2001, Pages 119-139

  Milyo, Jeffrey ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035600468     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1012098104745     Document Type: Article

References (32)

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