Electoral and financial effects of changes in committee power: The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget reform, the tax reform act of 1986, and the money committees in the house

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 93-111

  Milyo, Jeffrey ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031498338     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/467367     Document Type: Article

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