Political competition with campaign contributions and informative advertising

Journal of the European Economic Association

Volumn 2, Issue 5, 2004, Pages 772-804

  Coate, Stephen ^a  

^a Department of Molecular Biology and Genetics   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957244915     PISSN: 15424766     EISSN: 15424774     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/1542476042782251     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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