Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements: The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 1-31

  Potters, Jan ^a   Sloof, Randolph ^b   Van Winden, Frans ^b  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Campaign expenditures; Endorsements; Interest groups

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031065806     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(96)00032-8     Document Type: Article

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