Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 620-629

  Goldberg, Andrew V ^a   Hartline, Jason D ^a  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COLLUSION-RESISTANT MECHANISMS; MAXIMIZING AUCTIONS; SINGLE-PARAMETER AGENTS; SPANNING TREES;

ALGORITHMS; APPROXIMATION THEORY; COMPUTER SCIENCE; DESIGN; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; OPTIMIZATION; TREES (MATHEMATICS);

INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

EID: 20744431571     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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