Competitiveness via consensus

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 215-222

  Goldberg, Andrew V ^a   Hartline, Jason D ^b  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; ESTIMATION; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; RANDOM PROCESSES; SET THEORY; THEOREM PROVING;

COMPETITIVE REVENUE MAXIMIZING AUCTIONS; CONSENSUS ESTIMATE TECHNIQUE; CONSENSUS REVENUE ESTIMATE AUCTIONS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 0038077574     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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