Envy-free auctions for digital goods

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 29-35

  Goldberg, Andrew V ^a   Hartline, Jason D ^b  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b University of Washington   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Competitive analysis

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; OPTIMIZATION;

AUCTIONS; COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 0242456247     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/779928.779932     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (11)

1. A. Archer, C. Papadimitriou, K. Tawar, and E. Tardos. An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents. In Proc. 14th Symp. on Discrete Alg. ACM/SIAM, 2003.
2. J. Bulow and J Roberts. The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions. The Journal of Political Economy, 97:1060-90, 1989.
3. K. Deshmukh, A. V. Goldberg, J. D. Hartline, and A. R. Karlin. Truthful and Competitive DOuble Auctions. In Proceedings of the European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA'02), Roma Italy. R. Mhring and R. Raman (eds.), LNCS, Springer-Verlag, 2002.
4. A. Fiat, A. Goldberg, J. Hartline, and A. Karlin. Competitive Generalized Auctions. In Proc. 34th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing. ACM Press, New York, 2002.
5. A. V. Goldberg and J. D. Hartline. Competitiveness via Concensus. In Proc. 14th Symp. on Discrete Alg. ACM/SIAM, 2003.
6. A. V. Goldberg, J. D. Hartline, A. Karlin, M. Saks, and A. Wright. Competitive auctions and digital goods. Games and Economic Behavior, 2002. Submitted for publication. An earlier version available as InterTrust Technical Report at URL http://www.star-lab.com/tr/tr-99-01.html.
7. H. Moulin and S. Shenker. Strategyproof Sharing of Submodular Costs. Economic Theory, to appear.
8. R. Myerson. Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6:58-73, 1981.
9. R. Radner. Collusive Behavior in Noncooperative Epsilon-Equilibria of Oligopolies with Long but Finite Lives. J. Economic Theory, 22:136-154, 1980.
10. J. Schummer. Almost dominant strategy implementation. Technical report, MEDS, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, 2001. Available from http://www.kellogg.nwu.edu/faculty/schummer/ftp/research/esp.ps.
11. W. Vickrey. Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. J. of Finance, 16:8-37, 1961.