Manipulation through Bribes

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 91, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 180-198

  Schummer, James ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Strategy proof; bribe; manipulation; collusion

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009995324     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2618     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. Barberà S., Jackson M. Strategy-proof exchange. Econometrica. 63:1995;51-87.
2. Berge C. Topological Spaces. 1963;Macmillan Co. New York.
3. Chichilnisky G., Heal G. The geometry of implementation: A necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games. Soc. Choice Welfare. 14:1997;259-294.
4. Clarke E. Multipart pricing of public goods. Pub. Choice. 8:1971;19-33.
5. Crémer J. Manipulations by coalitions under asymmetric information: the case of groves mechanisms. Games Econ. Behavior. 13:1996;39-73.
6. Green J., Laffont J.-J. Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public goods. Econometrica. 45:1977;427-438.
7. Green J., Laffont J.-J. On coalition incentive compatibility. Rev. Econ. Stud. 46:1979;243-254.
8. Groves T. Incentives in teams. Econometrica. 41:1973;617-631.
9. Holmström B. Groves' scheme on restricted domains. Econometrica. 47:1979;1137-1144.
10. Hurwicz L. On informationally decentralized systems. McGuire C. B., Radner R. Decision and Organization. 1972;297-336 North-Holland, Amsterdam.
11. Hurwicz L., Walker M. On the generic non-optimality of dominant strategy allocation mechanisms. Econometrica. 58:1990;683-704.
12. Moulin H. On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness. Pub. Choice. 35:1980;437-455.
13. Schummer J. Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation. Games Econ. Behavior. 30:2000;293-318.
14. S. Serizawa, Pairwise strategy-proofness, mimeo, Shiga University, 1998.
15. Sundaram R. A First Course in Optimization. 1996;Cambridge Univ. Press, New York.
16. Tirole J. Collusion and the theory of organizations. Laffont J.-J. Advances in Economic Theory, sixth World Congress. 1992;Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge.