Power Politics and the Balance of Risk: Hypotheses on Great Power Intervention in the Periphery

Political Psychology

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 177-211

  Taliaferro, Jeffrey W ^a  

^a TUFTS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Balance of risk theory; Defensive realism; Escalation of commitment; Expectation levels; Loss aversion; Periphery; Prospect theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 1842832077     PISSN: 0162895X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00368.x     Document Type: Article

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