Prospect theory and the Cuban missile crisis

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 45, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 241-270

  Haas, M L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; POLITICAL THEORY;

CUBA;

EID: 0034949725     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0020-8833.00190     Document Type: Article

References (64)

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