Realism, neoliberalism, and cooperation: Understanding the debate

International Security

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 42-62

  Jervis, Robert ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033413897     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228899560040     Document Type: Article

References (144)

1. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51; Mearsheimer "A Realist Reply," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 82-93. See also Martin and Beth Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 729-758; and Keohane and Martin "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," paper prepared for meeting on "Progress in International Relations Theory," January 15-16, 1999, Scottsdale, Arizona, which says that "institutional theory" is a more descriptive title than "neoliberal institutionalism."
2. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51; Mearsheimer "A Realist Reply," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 82-93. See also Martin and Beth Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 729-758; and Keohane and Martin "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," paper prepared for meeting on "Progress in International Relations Theory," January 15-16, 1999, Scottsdale, Arizona, which says that "institutional theory" is a more descriptive title than "neoliberal institutionalism."
3. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51; Mearsheimer "A Realist Reply," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 82-93. See also Martin and Beth Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 729-758; and Keohane and Martin "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," paper prepared for meeting on "Progress in International Relations Theory," January 15-16, 1999, Scottsdale, Arizona, which says that "institutional theory" is a more descriptive title than "neoliberal institutionalism."
4. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51; Mearsheimer "A Realist Reply," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 82-93. See also Martin and Beth Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 729-758; and Keohane and Martin "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," paper prepared for meeting on "Progress in International Relations Theory," January 15-16, 1999, Scottsdale, Arizona, which says that "institutional theory" is a more descriptive title than "neoliberal institutionalism."
5. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51; Mearsheimer "A Realist Reply," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 82-93. See also Martin and Beth Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 729-758; and Keohane and Martin "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," paper prepared for meeting on "Progress in International Relations Theory," January 15-16, 1999, Scottsdale, Arizona, which says that "institutional theory" is a more descriptive title than "neoliberal institutionalism."
6. My definition of the distinction between offensive and defensive realism can be found below, pp. 48-50. For other discussions, see Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 177-198; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121; Stephen Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-478; Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49; and Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 114-155. Glaser uses the term "contingent realism," which I think is more descriptive than "defensive realism," but I use the latter term because it has gained greater currency.
7. My definition of the distinction between offensive and defensive realism can be found below, pp. 48-50. For other discussions, see Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 177-198; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121; Stephen Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-478; Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49; and Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 114-155. Glaser uses the term "contingent realism," which I think is more descriptive than "defensive realism," but I use the latter term because it has gained greater currency.
8. My definition of the distinction between offensive and defensive realism can be found below, pp. 48-50. For other discussions, see Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 177-198; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121; Stephen Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-478; Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49; and Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 114-155. Glaser uses the term "contingent realism," which I think is more descriptive than "defensive realism," but I use the latter term because it has gained greater currency.
9. My definition of the distinction between offensive and defensive realism can be found below, pp. 48-50. For other discussions, see Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 177-198; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121; Stephen Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-478; Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49; and Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 114-155. Glaser uses the term "contingent realism," which I think is more descriptive than "defensive realism," but I use the latter term because it has gained greater currency.
10. My definition of the distinction between offensive and defensive realism can be found below, pp. 48-50. For other discussions, see Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 177-198; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121; Stephen Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-478; Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49; and Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 114-155. Glaser uses the term "contingent realism," which I think is more descriptive than "defensive realism," but I use the latter term because it has gained greater currency.
11. My definition of the distinction between offensive and defensive realism can be found below, pp. 48-50. For other discussions, see Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 177-198; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121; Stephen Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-478; Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49; and Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 114-155. Glaser uses the term "contingent realism," which I think is more descriptive than "defensive realism," but I use the latter term because it has gained greater currency.
12. My definition of the distinction between offensive and defensive realism can be found below, pp. 48-50. For other discussions, see Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 177-198; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121; Stephen Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-478; Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49; and Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 114-155. Glaser uses the term "contingent realism," which I think is more descriptive than "defensive realism," but I use the latter term because it has gained greater currency.
13. I use this term because I do not think realism and neoliberal institutionalism can be sharply defined. Indeed, they are better labeled schools of thought or approaches than theories. Although this vagueness contributes to confusion as scholars talk past one another, a precise definition would be necessary only if either of these approaches really were a tight theory. In that case, falsification of propositions derived from the theory would cast doubt on the entire enterprise. But, for better and for worse, neither of these approaches has the sort of integrity that would permit the use of that logic. For an attempt to formulate a rigorous, but I think excessively narrow, definition of realism, see Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999). See also Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," in Robert L. Rothstein, ed., The Evolution of Theory in International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 21-38; and the exchange between Colin Elman and Waltz in Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 7-61.
14. I use this term because I do not think realism and neoliberal institutionalism can be sharply defined. Indeed, they are better labeled schools of thought or approaches than theories. Although this vagueness contributes to confusion as scholars talk past one another, a precise definition would be necessary only if either of these approaches really were a tight theory. In that case, falsification of propositions derived from the theory would cast doubt on the entire enterprise. But, for better and for worse, neither of these approaches has the sort of integrity that would permit the use of that logic. For an attempt to formulate a rigorous, but I think excessively narrow, definition of realism, see Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999). See also Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," in Robert L. Rothstein, ed., The Evolution of Theory in International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 21-38; and the exchange between Colin Elman and Waltz in Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 7-61.
15. I use this term because I do not think realism and neoliberal institutionalism can be sharply defined. Indeed, they are better labeled schools of thought or approaches than theories. Although this vagueness contributes to confusion as scholars talk past one another, a precise definition would be necessary only if either of these approaches really were a tight theory. In that case, falsification of propositions derived from the theory would cast doubt on the entire enterprise. But, for better and for worse, neither of these approaches has the sort of integrity that would permit the use of that logic. For an attempt to formulate a rigorous, but I think excessively narrow, definition of realism, see Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999). See also Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," in Robert L. Rothstein, ed., The Evolution of Theory in International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 21-38; and the exchange between Colin Elman and Waltz in Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 7-61.
16. Keohane and Martin, "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," p. 3; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 9, 29, 67; Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), pp. 7-9. See also Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," p. 85; Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, Supplement 1 (May 1997), pp. 1-32; and Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," pp. 739-740. In the statement quoted, Keohane and Martin refer to neorealism, not realism. For the purposes of this article, I do not need to distinguish between the two, as Waltz does very well in "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory."
17. Keohane and Martin, "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," p. 3; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 9, 29, 67; Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), pp. 7-9. See also Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," p. 85; Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, Supplement 1 (May 1997), pp. 1-32; and Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," pp. 739-740. In the statement quoted, Keohane and Martin refer to neorealism, not realism. For the purposes of this article, I do not need to distinguish between the two, as Waltz does very well in "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory."
18. Keohane and Martin, "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," p. 3; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 9, 29, 67; Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), pp. 7-9. See also Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," p. 85; Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, Supplement 1 (May 1997), pp. 1-32; and Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," pp. 739-740. In the statement quoted, Keohane and Martin refer to neorealism, not realism. For the purposes of this article, I do not need to distinguish between the two, as Waltz does very well in "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory."
19. Keohane and Martin, "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," p. 3; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 9, 29, 67; Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), pp. 7-9. See also Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," p. 85; Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, Supplement 1 (May 1997), pp. 1-32; and Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," pp. 739-740. In the statement quoted, Keohane and Martin refer to neorealism, not realism. For the purposes of this article, I do not need to distinguish between the two, as Waltz does very well in "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory."
20. Keohane and Martin, "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," p. 3; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 9, 29, 67; Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), pp. 7-9. See also Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," p. 85; Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, Supplement 1 (May 1997), pp. 1-32; and Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," pp. 739-740. In the statement quoted, Keohane and Martin refer to neorealism, not realism. For the purposes of this article, I do not need to distinguish between the two, as Waltz does very well in "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory."
21. Keohane and Martin, "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," p. 3; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 9, 29, 67; Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), pp. 7-9. See also Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," p. 85; Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, Supplement 1 (May 1997), pp. 1-32; and Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," pp. 739-740. In the statement quoted, Keohane and Martin refer to neorealism, not realism. For the purposes of this article, I do not need to distinguish between the two, as Waltz does very well in "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory."
22. The realization that commitment is difficult within states as well has led to enormous progress in understanding domestic politics and arrangements among private actors, thus making recent analyses in American and comparative politics appear quite familiar to students of international politics. See Helen V. Milner, "Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis among International Politics and American and Comparative Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 759-786. It is often assumed that anarchy and the possibility of the use of force are the same, but this is not correct, as shown by Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique," Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 71-74; and Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 330-334.
23. The realization that commitment is difficult within states as well has led to enormous progress in understanding domestic politics and arrangements among private actors, thus making recent analyses in American and comparative politics appear quite familiar to students of international politics. See Helen V. Milner, "Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis among International Politics and American and Comparative Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 759-786. It is often assumed that anarchy and the possibility of the use of force are the same, but this is not correct, as shown by Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique," Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 71-74; and Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 330-334.
24. The realization that commitment is difficult within states as well has led to enormous progress in understanding domestic politics and arrangements among private actors, thus making recent analyses in American and comparative politics appear quite familiar to students of international politics. See Helen V. Milner, "Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis among International Politics and American and Comparative Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 759-786. It is often assumed that anarchy and the possibility of the use of force are the same, but this is not correct, as shown by Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique," Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 71-74; and Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 330-334.
25. The differences may be sharper in some central issues I am putting aside here: the efficacy and fungibility of various forms of power, especially military power; the differences in state behavior when force, coercion, or unilateral solutions are available; and the frequency of such situations.
26. This view is hard even to conceptualize in a multipolar world. Any gain of territory or power by state A would have to come at the expense of some other state, but if it diminishes state B or state C, this might aid state D, at least in the short run, if D is the rival of B or C. Here the situation is zero-sum (or, more technically, constant sum) overall, but not all actors are hurt, and some may be advantaged, by another's gain.
27. How to measure and even conceptualize conflict and conflict of interest is not easy. See Robert Axelrod, Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1970).
28. The differences between the issue areas are not inherent, but it is generally believed that the factors that are conducive to cooperation, such as vulnerability, offensive advantage, and lack of transparency, are more prevalent in IPE than in the security arena. See Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 358-360; and Charles H. Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1 (October 1984), pp. 1-23.
29. The differences between the issue areas are not inherent, but it is generally believed that the factors that are conducive to cooperation, such as vulnerability, offensive advantage, and lack of transparency, are more prevalent in IPE than in the security arena. See Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 358-360; and Charles H. Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1 (October 1984), pp. 1-23.
30. Nonetheless, I think neoliberals were enlightened by Jack Knight's argument that institutions can affect not only the level of cooperation, but who gains more. See Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Similarly, while neoliberals have drawn heavily on the literature on organizations, they pay little attention to power-laden analyses such as Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3d ed. (New York: Random House, 1986). Robert O. Keohane acknowledges that he initially underestimated the significance of distributive issues. See Keohane "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 446-447. See also Keohane and Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," pp. 45-46. For a good discussion of distribution and institutions, see Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," pp. 338-343. For an argument that the shape of domestic institutions affects both the chance of international agreement and the distribution of the benefits, see Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
31. Nonetheless, I think neoliberals were enlightened by Jack Knight's argument that institutions can affect not only the level of cooperation, but who gains more. See Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Similarly, while neoliberals have drawn heavily on the literature on organizations, they pay little attention to power-laden analyses such as Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3d ed. (New York: Random House, 1986). Robert O. Keohane acknowledges that he initially underestimated the significance of distributive issues. See Keohane "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 446-447. See also Keohane and Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," pp. 45-46. For a good discussion of distribution and institutions, see Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," pp. 338-343. For an argument that the shape of domestic institutions affects both the chance of international agreement and the distribution of the benefits, see Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
32. Nonetheless, I think neoliberals were enlightened by Jack Knight's argument that institutions can affect not only the level of cooperation, but who gains more. See Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Similarly, while neoliberals have drawn heavily on the literature on organizations, they pay little attention to power-laden analyses such as Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3d ed. (New York: Random House, 1986). Robert O. Keohane acknowledges that he initially underestimated the significance of distributive issues. See Keohane "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 446-447. See also Keohane and Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," pp. 45-46. For a good discussion of distribution and institutions, see Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," pp. 338-343. For an argument that the shape of domestic institutions affects both the chance of international agreement and the distribution of the benefits, see Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
33. Nonetheless, I think neoliberals were enlightened by Jack Knight's argument that institutions can affect not only the level of cooperation, but who gains more. See Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Similarly, while neoliberals have drawn heavily on the literature on organizations, they pay little attention to power-laden analyses such as Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3d ed. (New York: Random House, 1986). Robert O. Keohane acknowledges that he initially underestimated the significance of distributive issues. See Keohane "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 446-447. See also Keohane and Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," pp. 45-46. For a good discussion of distribution and institutions, see Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," pp. 338-343. For an argument that the shape of domestic institutions affects both the chance of international agreement and the distribution of the benefits, see Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
34. Nonetheless, I think neoliberals were enlightened by Jack Knight's argument that institutions can affect not only the level of cooperation, but who gains more. See Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Similarly, while neoliberals have drawn heavily on the literature on organizations, they pay little attention to power-laden analyses such as Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3d ed. (New York: Random House, 1986). Robert O. Keohane acknowledges that he initially underestimated the significance of distributive issues. See Keohane "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 446-447. See also Keohane and Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," pp. 45-46. For a good discussion of distribution and institutions, see Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," pp. 338-343. For an argument that the shape of domestic institutions affects both the chance of international agreement and the distribution of the benefits, see Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
35. Nonetheless, I think neoliberals were enlightened by Jack Knight's argument that institutions can affect not only the level of cooperation, but who gains more. See Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Similarly, while neoliberals have drawn heavily on the literature on organizations, they pay little attention to power-laden analyses such as Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3d ed. (New York: Random House, 1986). Robert O. Keohane acknowledges that he initially underestimated the significance of distributive issues. See Keohane "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 446-447. See also Keohane and Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," pp. 45-46. For a good discussion of distribution and institutions, see Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," pp. 338-343. For an argument that the shape of domestic institutions affects both the chance of international agreement and the distribution of the benefits, see Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
36. Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 701-726; Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," pp. 334-338; Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," pp. 74-75; and Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), chap. 5. Issues of relative versus absolute gains are not the same as distribution versus efficiency because an actor can care about distribution even in the absence of concerns about relative gains. It should also be noted that although the main reason for seeking relative gains today is to improve one's absolute situation tomorrow, some goods are inherently positional. See the classic and yet underappreciated analysis of Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976).
37. Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 701-726; Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," pp. 334-338; Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," pp. 74-75; and Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), chap. 5. Issues of relative versus absolute gains are not the same as distribution versus efficiency because an actor can care about distribution even in the absence of concerns about relative gains. It should also be noted that although the main reason for seeking relative gains today is to improve one's absolute situation tomorrow, some goods are inherently positional. See the classic and yet underappreciated analysis of Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976).
38. Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 701-726; Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," pp. 334-338; Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," pp. 74-75; and Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), chap. 5. Issues of relative versus absolute gains are not the same as distribution versus efficiency because an actor can care about distribution even in the absence of concerns about relative gains. It should also be noted that although the main reason for seeking relative gains today is to improve one's absolute situation tomorrow, some goods are inherently positional. See the classic and yet underappreciated analysis of Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976).
39. Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 701-726; Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," pp. 334-338; Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," pp. 74-75; and Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), chap. 5. Issues of relative versus absolute gains are not the same as distribution versus efficiency because an actor can care about distribution even in the absence of concerns about relative gains. It should also be noted that although the main reason for seeking relative gains today is to improve one's absolute situation tomorrow, some goods are inherently positional. See the classic and yet underappreciated analysis of Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976).
40. Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 701-726; Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," pp. 334-338; Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," pp. 74-75; and Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), chap. 5. Issues of relative versus absolute gains are not the same as distribution versus efficiency because an actor can care about distribution even in the absence of concerns about relative gains. It should also be noted that although the main reason for seeking relative gains today is to improve one's absolute situation tomorrow, some goods are inherently positional. See the classic and yet underappreciated analysis of Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976).
41. Bernard Brodie et al., The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946).
42. When states are allied - and expect to remain so in the future - each may gain "security externalities" from the others' economic gains. See Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), chap. 3. But relative economic gains can redistribute power within an alliance (as shown by Arthur A. Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order," International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 [Spring 1984], pp. 355-386), and will be of concern if actors believe that they will influence future wealth. See Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 54-59; and John C. Matthews III, "Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 112-146. Furthermore, despite the existence of nuclear weapons, an extreme gap in the economic health of the United States and Western Europe on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, undermined the latter's security, largely by sapping its self-confidence.
43. When states are allied - and expect to remain so in the future - each may gain "security externalities" from the others' economic gains. See Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), chap. 3. But relative economic gains can redistribute power within an alliance (as shown by Arthur A. Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order," International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 [Spring 1984], pp. 355-386), and will be of concern if actors believe that they will influence future wealth. See Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 54-59; and John C. Matthews III, "Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 112-146. Furthermore, despite the existence of nuclear weapons, an extreme gap in the economic health of the United States and Western Europe on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, undermined the latter's security, largely by sapping its self-confidence.
44. When states are allied - and expect to remain so in the future - each may gain "security externalities" from the others' economic gains. See Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), chap. 3. But relative economic gains can redistribute power within an alliance (as shown by Arthur A. Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order," International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 [Spring 1984], pp. 355-386), and will be of concern if actors believe that they will influence future wealth. See Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 54-59; and John C. Matthews III, "Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 112-146. Furthermore, despite the existence of nuclear weapons, an extreme gap in the economic health of the United States and Western Europe on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, undermined the latter's security, largely by sapping its self-confidence.
45. When states are allied - and expect to remain so in the future - each may gain "security externalities" from the others' economic gains. See Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), chap. 3. But relative economic gains can redistribute power within an alliance (as shown by Arthur A. Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order," International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 [Spring 1984], pp. 355-386), and will be of concern if actors believe that they will influence future wealth. See Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 54-59; and John C. Matthews III, "Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 112-146. Furthermore, despite the existence of nuclear weapons, an extreme gap in the economic health of the United States and Western Europe on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, undermined the latter's security, largely by sapping its self-confidence.
46. The greatest deficiency in the relative/absolute gains literature is that it has remained largely at the level of theory and prescription, with much less attention to when decisionmakers do in fact exhibit relative-gains concerns. Thus as noteworthy as the fact that leading academics employed impeccable logic to demonstrate the irrelevance of relative advantage in a world of mutual second-strike capabilities was the fact that each side's decisionmakers remained unpersuaded, continued to fear that the other sought nuclear superiority, and sought advantage, if not superiority, for itself. For a related argument, see Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," pp. 86-88. For a good empirical study in the trade area, see Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 73-113.
47. The greatest deficiency in the relative/absolute gains literature is that it has remained largely at the level of theory and prescription, with much less attention to when decisionmakers do in fact exhibit relative-gains concerns. Thus as noteworthy as the fact that leading academics employed impeccable logic to demonstrate the irrelevance of relative advantage in a world of mutual second-strike capabilities was the fact that each side's decisionmakers remained unpersuaded, continued to fear that the other sought nuclear superiority, and sought advantage, if not superiority, for itself. For a related argument, see Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," pp. 86-88. For a good empirical study in the trade area, see Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 73-113.
48. For a parallel discussion of "real" and "illusory" incompatibility, see Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 3, No. 2 (June 1959), p. 130. This distinction and the one I am making are not without their difficulties, as I discuss below. The move from conflicting preferences to conflictful behavior is not entirely direct because if information is complete and outcomes are infinitely divisible, the actors should be able to find a way of reaching the outcome that is cheaper than engaging in costly conflict. This is known as the Hicks paradox in economics and was introduced into the international relations literature by James D. Fearon in "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414. The subject is important but not central to the issues of concern here.
49. For a parallel discussion of "real" and "illusory" incompatibility, see Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 3, No. 2 (June 1959), p. 130. This distinction and the one I am making are not without their difficulties, as I discuss below. The move from conflicting preferences to conflictful behavior is not entirely direct because if information is complete and outcomes are infinitely divisible, the actors should be able to find a way of reaching the outcome that is cheaper than engaging in costly conflict. This is known as the Hicks paradox in economics and was introduced into the international relations literature by James D. Fearon in "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414. The subject is important but not central to the issues of concern here.
50. Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communication and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 336-366.
51. This is not to say that all arguments that actors are below the Pareto frontier share neoliberalism's stress on the importance of institutions. Thus Deborah W. Larson's analysis of missed opportunities during the Cold War seeks to demonstrate that, at a number of points, lack of trust and related psychological impediments prevented the United States and the Soviet Union from relaxing tensions and reaching agreements that would have made both of them both better off. See Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations during the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).
52. For discussion, see Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," pp. 744-747; and James K. Sebenius, "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 334-339.
53. For discussion, see Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," pp. 744-747; and James K. Sebenius, "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 334-339.
54. John J. Mearsheimer, Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, forthcoming).
55. Of Gray's voluminous writings, see, for example, Colin Gray, Weapons Don't Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military Technology (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993); and Gray, House of Cards': Wliy Arms Control Must Fail (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992).
56. Of Gray's voluminous writings, see, for example, Colin Gray, Weapons Don't Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military Technology (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993); and Gray, House of Cards': Wliy Arms Control Must Fail (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992).
57. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107; and Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias." See also Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing." This is why Charles Glaser sees "realists as optimists": in most circumstances, states that seek security can develop a military posture that signals their benign intentions, thereby minimizing unnecessary conflict. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," pp. 67-70.
58. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107; and Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias." See also Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing." This is why Charles Glaser sees "realists as optimists": in most circumstances, states that seek security can develop a military posture that signals their benign intentions, thereby minimizing unnecessary conflict. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," pp. 67-70.
59. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107; and Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias." See also Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing." This is why Charles Glaser sees "realists as optimists": in most circumstances, states that seek security can develop a military posture that signals their benign intentions, thereby minimizing unnecessary conflict. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," pp. 67-70.
60. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107; and Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias." See also Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing." This is why Charles Glaser sees "realists as optimists": in most circumstances, states that seek security can develop a military posture that signals their benign intentions, thereby minimizing unnecessary conflict. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," pp. 67-70.
61. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107; and Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias." See also Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing." This is why Charles Glaser sees "realists as optimists": in most circumstances, states that seek security can develop a military posture that signals their benign intentions, thereby minimizing unnecessary conflict. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," pp. 67-70.
62. Quoted in Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics, 7th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953), p. 283.
63. A particularly insightful use of counterfactuals to explore changes that could have avoided a major war is Paul W. Schroeder, "Embedded Counterfactuals and the Case for World War I as an 'Unavoidable' War," in Richard Ned Lebow, Philip E. Tetlock, and Geoffrey Parker, eds., "Unmaking the West: Exploring Alternative Histories of Counterfactual Worlds," unpublished book manuscript, Ohio State University. I am concerned here with short-run changes that could reduce a current conflict, not with changes such as instituting a world government, making all states democratic, or using future DNA technology to alter human nature.
64. Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," pp. 318-321.
65. Thus reputation plays a central role in neoliberalism parallel to its role in deterrence theory. But what little empirical research we have casts grave doubt on the standard deductive claims for how reputations form and operate. See Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); and Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). See also Robert Jervis, "Signaling and Perception," in Kristen Monroe, ed., "Political Psychology," unpublished book manuscript, University of California at Irvine.
66. Thus reputation plays a central role in neoliberalism parallel to its role in deterrence theory. But what little empirical research we have casts grave doubt on the standard deductive claims for how reputations form and operate. See Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); and Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). See also Robert Jervis, "Signaling and Perception," in Kristen Monroe, ed., "Political Psychology," unpublished book manuscript, University of California at Irvine.
67. Thus reputation plays a central role in neoliberalism parallel to its role in deterrence theory. But what little empirical research we have casts grave doubt on the standard deductive claims for how reputations form and operate. See Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); and Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). See also Robert Jervis, "Signaling and Perception," in Kristen Monroe, ed., "Political Psychology," unpublished book manuscript, University of California at Irvine.
68. Keohane, After Hegemony. See also Celeste A. Wallander, Mortal Friends, Best Enemies: German-Russian Cooperation after the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 19-34.
69. Keohane, After Hegemony. See also Celeste A. Wallander, Mortal Friends, Best Enemies: German-Russian Cooperation after the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 19-34.
70. Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), which includes essays by defensive realists and neoliberals. These arguments were developed in works that formed the basis for the Oye volume: Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Keohane, After Hegemony. It is not true, however, that a long "shadow of the future" by itself increases cooperation. When an agreement is expected to last for a long time, the incentives to bargain harder are greater. See James D. Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 269-305. Similarly, when what is at stake are actors' reputations for standing firm, as was true in many Cold War interactions, then issues of little intrinsic importance produce very high conflict. Much of the relative gains problem turns
71. Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), which includes essays by defensive realists and neoliberals. These arguments were developed in works that formed the basis for the Oye volume: Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Keohane, After Hegemony. It is not true, however, that a long "shadow of the future" by itself increases cooperation. When an agreement is expected to last for a long time, the incentives to bargain harder are greater. See James D. Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 269-305. Similarly, when what is at stake are actors' reputations for standing firm, as was true in many Cold War interactions, then issues of little intrinsic importance produce very high conflict. Much of the relative gains problem turns on the expectation that the outcome of the current interaction will strongly affect the actors' future well-being; states often fight at one time because they fear that otherwise they will be at a greater disadvantage in the future. Neoliberals argue that institutions can curb these effects.
72. Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), which includes essays by defensive realists and neoliberals. These arguments were developed in works that formed the basis for the Oye volume: Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Keohane, After Hegemony. It is not true, however, that a long "shadow of the future" by itself increases cooperation. When an agreement is expected to last for a long time, the incentives to bargain harder are greater. See James D. Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 269-305. Similarly, when what is at stake are actors' reputations for standing firm, as was true in many Cold War interactions, then issues of little intrinsic importance produce very high conflict. Much of the relative gains problem turns on the expectation that the outcome of the current interaction will strongly affect the actors' future well-being; states often fight at one time because they fear that otherwise they will be at a greater disadvantage in the future. Neoliberals argue that institutions can curb these effects.
73. Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), which includes essays by defensive realists and neoliberals. These arguments were developed in works that formed the basis for the Oye volume: Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Keohane, After Hegemony. It is not true, however, that a long "shadow of the future" by itself increases cooperation. When an agreement is expected to last for a long time, the incentives to bargain harder are greater. See James D. Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 269-305. Similarly, when what is at stake are actors' reputations for standing firm, as was true in many Cold War interactions, then issues of little intrinsic importance produce very high conflict. Much of the relative gains problem turns on the expectation that the outcome of the current interaction will strongly affect the actors' future well-being; states often fight at one time because they fear that otherwise they will be at a greater disadvantage in the future. Neoliberals argue that institutions can curb these effects.
74. Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), which includes essays by defensive realists and neoliberals. These arguments were developed in works that formed the basis for the Oye volume: Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Keohane, After Hegemony. It is not true, however, that a long "shadow of the future" by itself increases cooperation. When an agreement is expected to last for a long time, the incentives to bargain harder are greater. See James D. Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 269-305. Similarly, when what is at stake are actors' reputations for standing firm, as was true in many Cold War interactions, then issues of little intrinsic importance produce very high conflict. Much of the relative gains problem turns on the expectation that the outcome of the current interaction will strongly affect the actors' future well-being; states often fight at one time because they fear that otherwise they will be at a greater disadvantage in the future. Neoliberals argue that institutions can curb these effects.
75. For the importance of diagnosis, see Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993). See also Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3. In many cases, contemporary policymakers or later analysts may not be clear as to whether they are disagreeing about the nature of the situation the state is in or the policies that are appropriate for that situation.
76. For the importance of diagnosis, see Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993). See also Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3. In many cases, contemporary policymakers or later analysts may not be clear as to whether they are disagreeing about the nature of the situation the state is in or the policies that are appropriate for that situation.
77. Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).
78. Similar definitions are found in Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict, pp. 2-4; Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), pp. 4-5; and Celeste A. Wallander, Helga Haftendorn, and Robert O. Keohane, "Introduction," in Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 1-2. Despite its roots in economics, neoliberalism's treatment of institutions pays scant attention to principal-agent problems and the ways in which institutions and their leaders can maximize their own self-interest at the expense of those of the principals.
79. Similar definitions are found in Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict, pp. 2-4; Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), pp. 4-5; and Celeste A. Wallander, Helga Haftendorn, and Robert O. Keohane, "Introduction," in Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 1-2. Despite its roots in economics, neoliberalism's treatment of institutions pays scant attention to principal-agent problems and the ways in which institutions and their leaders can maximize their own self-interest at the expense of those of the principals.
80. Similar definitions are found in Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict, pp. 2-4; Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), pp. 4-5; and Celeste A. Wallander, Helga Haftendorn, and Robert O. Keohane, "Introduction," in Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 1-2. Despite its roots in economics, neoliberalism's treatment of institutions pays scant attention to principal-agent problems and the ways in which institutions and their leaders can maximize their own self-interest at the expense of those of the principals.
81. Keohane and Martin, "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," agree that the question is posed correctly, although answered incorrectly, in Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions." See also Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." For the finding that joint membership in international organizations is negatively correlated with conflict, see Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, and David R. Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-1985," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 441-168. The recent literature on the role of institutions in domestic politics is very large: recent surveys are Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5 (April 1996), pp. 936-957; and Ira Katznelson, "The Doleful Dance of Politics and Policy: Can Historical Institutionalism Make a Difference?" American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 1 (March 1998), pp. 191-197.
82. Keohane and Martin, "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," agree that the question is posed correctly, although answered incorrectly, in Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions." See also Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." For the finding that joint membership in international organizations is negatively correlated with conflict, see Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, and David R. Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-1985," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 441-168. The recent literature on the role of institutions in domestic politics is very large: recent surveys are Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5 (April 1996), pp. 936-957; and Ira Katznelson, "The Doleful Dance of Politics and Policy: Can Historical Institutionalism Make a Difference?" American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 1 (March 1998), pp. 191-197.
83. Keohane and Martin, "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," agree that the question is posed correctly, although answered incorrectly, in Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions." See also Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." For the finding that joint membership in international organizations is negatively correlated with conflict, see Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, and David R. Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-1985," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 441-168. The recent literature on the role of institutions in domestic politics is very large: recent surveys are Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5 (April 1996), pp. 936-957; and Ira Katznelson, "The Doleful Dance of Politics and Policy: Can Historical Institutionalism Make a Difference?" American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 1 (March 1998), pp. 191-197.
84. Keohane and Martin, "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," agree that the question is posed correctly, although answered incorrectly, in Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions." See also Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." For the finding that joint membership in international organizations is negatively correlated with conflict, see Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, and David R. Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-1985," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 441-168. The recent literature on the role of institutions in domestic politics is very large: recent surveys are Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5 (April 1996), pp. 936-957; and Ira Katznelson, "The Doleful Dance of Politics and Policy: Can Historical Institutionalism Make a Difference?" American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 1 (March 1998), pp. 191-197.
85. Keohane and Martin, "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," agree that the question is posed correctly, although answered incorrectly, in Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions." See also Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." For the finding that joint membership in international organizations is negatively correlated with conflict, see Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, and David R. Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-1985," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 441-168. The recent literature on the role of institutions in domestic politics is very large: recent surveys are Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5 (April 1996), pp. 936-957; and Ira Katznelson, "The Doleful Dance of Politics and Policy: Can Historical Institutionalism Make a Difference?" American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 1 (March 1998), pp. 191-197.
86. Keohane and Martin, "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," agree that the question is posed correctly, although answered incorrectly, in Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions." See also Martin and Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." For the finding that joint membership in international organizations is negatively correlated with conflict, see Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal, and David R. Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-1985," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 441-168. The recent literature on the role of institutions in domestic politics is very large: recent surveys are Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5 (April 1996), pp. 936-957; and Ira Katznelson, "The Doleful Dance of Politics and Policy: Can Historical Institutionalism Make a Difference?" American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 1 (March 1998), pp. 191-197.
87. Keohane and Martin, "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation." This is consistent with Keohane's "functional theory regimes" in After Hegemony, chap. 6.
88. Keohane and Martin, "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation." This is consistent with Keohane's "functional theory regimes" in After Hegemony, chap. 6.
89. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," p. 85. See also Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realism after the Cold War," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts, September 3-6, 1998, pp. 23-29.
90. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," p. 85. See also Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realism after the Cold War," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts, September 3-6, 1998, pp. 23-29.
91. Page V. Fortna, "A Peace That Lasts," Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Government, Harvard University, 1998. See also Caroline A. Hartzell, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 1 (February 1999), pp. 3-22; and Barbara F. Walter, "Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 127-155.
92. Page V. Fortna, "A Peace That Lasts," Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Government, Harvard University, 1998. See also Caroline A. Hartzell, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 1 (February 1999), pp. 3-22; and Barbara F. Walter, "Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 127-155.
93. Page V. Fortna, "A Peace That Lasts," Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Government, Harvard University, 1998. See also Caroline A. Hartzell, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 1 (February 1999), pp. 3-22; and Barbara F. Walter, "Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 127-155.
94. For further discussion of the methodological issues involved, see Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 81-87.
95. Compare, for example, Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interest and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 116-169, and Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1998). See also G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 44-45, 55. For the role of institutions in self-binding, see Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal Organizations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 1 (February 1998), pp. 3-32. This emphasis on commitment is consistent with the past generation of research that has argued that the crucial role of governments in economic development is their willingness and ability to maintain domestic order while guaranteeing that they will not confiscate property and wealth, and the work on intertemporal games explaining why and how individuals might bind themselves to do what they would otherwise not do in the future. For the former, the classic study is Douglass C. North and Robert D. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). For a brief summary of the literature in the latter area, see Partha Dasgupta, "Trust as a Commodity," in Diego Gambetta, ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 54-55.
96. Compare, for example, Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interest and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 116-169, and Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1998). See also G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 44-45, 55. For the role of institutions in self-binding, see Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal Organizations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 1 (February 1998), pp. 3-32. This emphasis on commitment is consistent with the past generation of research that has argued that the crucial role of governments in economic development is their willingness and ability to maintain domestic order while guaranteeing that they will not confiscate property and wealth, and the work on intertemporal games explaining why and how individuals might bind themselves to do what they would otherwise not do in the future. For the former, the classic study is Douglass C. North and Robert D. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). For a brief summary of the literature in the latter area, see Partha Dasgupta, "Trust as a Commodity," in Diego Gambetta, ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 54-55.
97. Compare, for example, Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interest and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 116-169, and Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1998). See also G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 44-45, 55. For the role of institutions in self-binding, see Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal Organizations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 1 (February 1998), pp. 3-32. This emphasis on commitment is consistent with the past generation of research that has argued that the crucial role of governments in economic development is their willingness and ability to maintain domestic order while guaranteeing that they will not confiscate property and wealth, and the work on intertemporal games explaining why and how individuals might bind themselves to do what they would otherwise not do in the future. For the former, the classic study is Douglass C. North and Robert D. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). For a brief summary of the literature in the latter area, see Partha Dasgupta, "Trust as a Commodity," in Diego Gambetta, ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 54-55.
98. Compare, for example, Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interest and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 116-169, and Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1998). See also G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 44-45, 55. For the role of institutions in self-binding, see Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal Organizations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 1 (February 1998), pp. 3-32. This emphasis on commitment is consistent with the past generation of research that has argued that the crucial role of governments in economic development is their willingness and ability to maintain domestic order while guaranteeing that they will not confiscate property and wealth, and the work on intertemporal games explaining why and how individuals might bind themselves to do what they would otherwise not do in the future. For the former, the classic study is Douglass C. North and Robert D. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). For a brief summary of the literature in the latter area, see Partha Dasgupta, "Trust as a Commodity," in Diego Gambetta, ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 54-55.
99. Compare, for example, Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interest and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 116-169, and Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1998). See also G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 44-45, 55. For the role of institutions in self-binding, see Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal Organizations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 1 (February 1998), pp. 3-32. This emphasis on commitment is consistent with the past generation of research that has argued that the crucial role of governments in economic development is their willingness and ability to maintain domestic order while guaranteeing that they will not confiscate property and wealth, and the work on intertemporal games explaining why and how individuals might bind themselves to do what they would otherwise not do in the future. For the former, the classic study is Douglass C. North and Robert D. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). For a brief summary of the literature in the latter area, see Partha Dasgupta, "Trust as a Commodity," in Diego Gambetta, ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 54-55.
100. Compare, for example, Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interest and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 116-169, and Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1998). See also G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 44-45, 55. For the role of institutions in self-binding, see Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal Organizations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 1 (February 1998), pp. 3-32. This emphasis on commitment is consistent with the past generation of research that has argued that the crucial role of governments in economic development is their willingness and ability to maintain domestic order while guaranteeing that they will not confiscate property and wealth, and the work on intertemporal games explaining why and how individuals might bind themselves to do what they would otherwise not do in the future. For the former, the classic study is Douglass C. North and Robert D. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). For a brief summary of the literature in the latter area, see Partha Dasgupta, "Trust as a Commodity," in Diego Gambetta, ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 54-55.
101. Compare, for example, Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interest and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 116-169, and Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1998). See also G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 44-45, 55. For the role of institutions in self-binding, see Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal Organizations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 1 (February 1998), pp. 3-32. This emphasis on commitment is consistent with the past generation of research that has argued that the crucial role of governments in economic development is their willingness and ability to maintain domestic order while guaranteeing that they will not confiscate property and wealth, and the work on intertemporal games explaining why and how individuals might bind themselves to do what they would otherwise not do in the future. For the former, the classic study is Douglass C. North and Robert D. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). For a brief summary of the literature in the latter area, see Partha Dasgupta, "Trust as a Commodity," in Diego Gambetta, ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 54-55.
102. Quoted in Jane Perlez, "Blunt Reasoning for Enlarging NATO: Curbs on Germany," New York Times, December 7, 1997, p. 18.
103. There is some overlap here with the arguments for the potential role of greater knowledge. See, for example, Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); and the special issue of International Organization on epistemic communities, edited by Peter J. Haas, "Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992).
104. There is some overlap here with the arguments for the potential role of greater knowledge. See, for example, Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); and the special issue of International Organization on epistemic communities, edited by Peter J. Haas, "Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992).
105. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), chap. 9; Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961); and Robert Jervis, "Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 108, No. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 239-253.
106. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), chap. 9; Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961); and Robert Jervis, "Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 108, No. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 239-253.
107. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), chap. 9; Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961); and Robert Jervis, "Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 108, No. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 239-253.
108. For a discussion of problems with realism on this score, see Robert Jervis, "Hans Morgenthau, Realism, and the Scientific Study of International Politics," Social Research, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Winter 1994), pp. 859-860.
109. Anthony Faiola, "Peru, Ecuador Sign Border Dispute," Washington Post, October 27, 1998, p. 20; and "Peru and Ecuador Sign Treaty to End Longstanding Conflict," New York Times, October 27, 1998, p. 3.
110. Anthony Faiola, "Peru, Ecuador Sign Border Dispute," Washington Post, October 27, 1998, p. 20; and "Peru and Ecuador Sign Treaty to End Longstanding Conflict," New York Times, October 27, 1998, p. 3.
111. Gary S. Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), part 1. For more subtle treatments, see Amartya Sen, "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory," Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1977), pp. 317-344; and Albert O. Hirschman, "Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories of Economic Discourse," in Hirschman, Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays (New York: Viking, 1986), chap. 6.
112. Gary S. Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), part 1. For more subtle treatments, see Amartya Sen, "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory," Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1977), pp. 317-344; and Albert O. Hirschman, "Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories of Economic Discourse," in Hirschman, Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays (New York: Viking, 1986), chap. 6.
113. Gary S. Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), part 1. For more subtle treatments, see Amartya Sen, "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory," Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1977), pp. 317-344; and Albert O. Hirschman, "Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories of Economic Discourse," in Hirschman, Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays (New York: Viking, 1986), chap. 6.
114. The literature on regional integration is enormous. See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954); Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958); the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn 1970), entitled "Regional Integration," Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds.; Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975); and Wayne Sandholtz, High-Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). For objections and rebuttals, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3 (Summer 1966), pp. 862-915; Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992); and Milward, Ruggero Ranieri, Frances Lynch, F. Romero, and Vibeke Sorensen, The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945-1992 (London: Routledge, 1993). The most thorough liberal account is Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe.
115. The literature on regional integration is enormous. See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954); Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958); the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn 1970), entitled "Regional Integration," Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds.; Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975); and Wayne Sandholtz, High-Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). For objections and rebuttals, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3 (Summer 1966), pp. 862-915; Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992); and Milward, Ruggero Ranieri, Frances Lynch, F. Romero, and Vibeke Sorensen, The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945-1992 (London: Routledge, 1993). The most thorough liberal account is Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe.
116. The literature on regional integration is enormous. See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954); Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958); the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn 1970), entitled "Regional Integration," Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds.; Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975); and Wayne Sandholtz, High-Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). For objections and rebuttals, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3 (Summer 1966), pp. 862-915; Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992); and Milward, Ruggero Ranieri, Frances Lynch, F. Romero, and Vibeke Sorensen, The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945-1992 (London: Routledge, 1993). The most thorough liberal account is Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe.
117. The literature on regional integration is enormous. See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954); Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958); the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn 1970), entitled "Regional Integration," Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds.; Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975); and Wayne Sandholtz, High-Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). For objections and rebuttals, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3 (Summer 1966), pp. 862-915; Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992); and Milward, Ruggero Ranieri, Frances Lynch, F. Romero, and Vibeke Sorensen, The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945-1992 (London: Routledge, 1993). The most thorough liberal account is Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe.
118. The literature on regional integration is enormous. See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954); Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958); the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn 1970), entitled "Regional Integration," Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds.; Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975); and Wayne Sandholtz, High-Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). For objections and rebuttals, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3 (Summer 1966), pp. 862-915; Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992); and Milward, Ruggero Ranieri, Frances Lynch, F. Romero, and Vibeke Sorensen, The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945-1992 (London: Routledge, 1993). The most thorough liberal account is Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe.
119. The literature on regional integration is enormous. See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954); Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958); the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn 1970), entitled "Regional Integration," Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds.; Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975); and Wayne Sandholtz, High-Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). For objections and rebuttals, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3 (Summer 1966), pp. 862-915; Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992); and Milward, Ruggero Ranieri, Frances Lynch, F. Romero, and Vibeke Sorensen, The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945-1992 (London: Routledge, 1993). The most thorough liberal account is Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe.
120. The literature on regional integration is enormous. See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954); Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958); the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn 1970), entitled "Regional Integration," Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds.; Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975); and Wayne Sandholtz, High-Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). For objections and rebuttals, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3 (Summer 1966), pp. 862-915; Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992); and Milward, Ruggero Ranieri, Frances Lynch, F. Romero, and Vibeke Sorensen, The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945-1992 (London: Routledge, 1993). The most thorough liberal account is Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe.
121. The literature on regional integration is enormous. See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954); Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958); the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn 1970), entitled "Regional Integration," Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds.; Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975); and Wayne Sandholtz, High-Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). For objections and rebuttals, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3 (Summer 1966), pp. 862-915; Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992); and Milward, Ruggero Ranieri, Frances Lynch, F. Romero, and Vibeke Sorensen, The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945-1992 (London: Routledge, 1993). The most thorough liberal account is Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe.
122. The literature on regional integration is enormous. See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954); Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958); the special issue of International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn 1970), entitled "Regional Integration," Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds.; Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975); and Wayne Sandholtz, High-Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). For objections and rebuttals, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3 (Summer 1966), pp. 862-915; Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992); and Milward, Ruggero Ranieri, Frances Lynch, F. Romero, and Vibeke Sorensen, The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945-1992 (London: Routledge, 1993). The most thorough liberal account is Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe.
123. For a brief discussion of both the intended and the unintended creation of identities, see James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 960-964.
124. Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 143-178. Martin and Simmons, "International Institutions," pp. 750-751, see unanticipated consequences (which they correctly note may not be the same as unintended ones) as a puzzle for institutional theory rather than as its strength.
125. Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 143-178. Martin and Simmons, "International Institutions," pp. 750-751, see unanticipated consequences (which they correctly note may not be the same as unintended ones) as a puzzle for institutional theory rather than as its strength.
126. Sigal, Disarming Strangers, p. 203.
127. Stephen Jay Gould, "Not Yet a Wing," Natural History, Vol. 94, No. 10 (October 1985), pp. 12-25. Institutions, like evolution, can also "lock in" arrangements that are suboptimal or advantage one party. There is also a parallel in the argument that "social capital" in the form of dense networks of groups and voluntary associations have the unintended effect of facilitating a wide range of political and economic activities. The best known work is perhaps Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). See also Putnam, "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America," PS: Political Science & Politics, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 664-683. For critical reviews of the literature, see Robert W. Jackman, "Social Capital and Politics," Annual Review of Political Science (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews Press, 1998), vol. 1, pp. 47-74; and Alejandro Portes, "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology," Annual Review of Sociology (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews Press, 1998), vol. 24, pp. 1-24.
128. Stephen Jay Gould, "Not Yet a Wing," Natural History, Vol. 94, No. 10 (October 1985), pp. 12-25. Institutions, like evolution, can also "lock in" arrangements that are suboptimal or advantage one party. There is also a parallel in the argument that "social capital" in the form of dense networks of groups and voluntary associations have the unintended effect of facilitating a wide range of political and economic activities. The best known work is perhaps Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). See also Putnam, "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America," PS: Political Science & Politics, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 664-683. For critical reviews of the literature, see Robert W. Jackman, "Social Capital and Politics," Annual Review of Political Science (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews Press, 1998), vol. 1, pp. 47-74; and Alejandro Portes, "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology," Annual Review of Sociology (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews Press, 1998), vol. 24, pp. 1-24.
129. Stephen Jay Gould, "Not Yet a Wing," Natural History, Vol. 94, No. 10 (October 1985), pp. 12-25. Institutions, like evolution, can also "lock in" arrangements that are suboptimal or advantage one party. There is also a parallel in the argument that "social capital" in the form of dense networks of groups and voluntary associations have the unintended effect of facilitating a wide range of political and economic activities. The best known work is perhaps Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). See also Putnam, "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America," PS: Political Science & Politics, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 664-683. For critical reviews of the literature, see Robert W. Jackman, "Social Capital and Politics," Annual Review of Political Science (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews Press, 1998), vol. 1, pp. 47-74; and Alejandro Portes, "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology," Annual Review of Sociology (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews Press, 1998), vol. 24, pp. 1-24.
130. Stephen Jay Gould, "Not Yet a Wing," Natural History, Vol. 94, No. 10 (October 1985), pp. 12-25. Institutions, like evolution, can also "lock in" arrangements that are suboptimal or advantage one party. There is also a parallel in the argument that "social capital" in the form of dense networks of groups and voluntary associations have the unintended effect of facilitating a wide range of political and economic activities. The best known work is perhaps Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). See also Putnam, "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America," PS: Political Science & Politics, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 664-683. For critical reviews of the literature, see Robert W. Jackman, "Social Capital and Politics," Annual Review of Political Science (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews Press, 1998), vol. 1, pp. 47-74; and Alejandro Portes, "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology," Annual Review of Sociology (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews Press, 1998), vol. 24, pp. 1-24.
131. Stephen Jay Gould, "Not Yet a Wing," Natural History, Vol. 94, No. 10 (October 1985), pp. 12-25. Institutions, like evolution, can also "lock in" arrangements that are suboptimal or advantage one party. There is also a parallel in the argument that "social capital" in the form of dense networks of groups and voluntary associations have the unintended effect of facilitating a wide range of political and economic activities. The best known work is perhaps Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). See also Putnam, "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America," PS: Political Science & Politics, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 664-683. For critical reviews of the literature, see Robert W. Jackman, "Social Capital and Politics," Annual Review of Political Science (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews Press, 1998), vol. 1, pp. 47-74; and Alejandro Portes, "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology," Annual Review of Sociology (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews Press, 1998), vol. 24, pp. 1-24.
132. Furthermore, post-Cold War developments show the continuing importance of national conflicts and U.S. power. Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-39; and Waltz, "Realism after the Cold War."
133. Furthermore, post-Cold War developments show the continuing importance of national conflicts and U.S. power. Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-39; and Waltz, "Realism after the Cold War."
134. Jervis, System Effects, pp. 146-165, 243-252.
135. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985).
136. Helen V. Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); Scott C. James and David A. Lake, "The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846," International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Winter 1989), pp. 1-29; and Lars S. Skålnes, "From the Inside Out: NATO Expansion and International Relations Theory," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 44-87. See also Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," p. 295. I think Martin and Simmons are too harsh when they say that "institutionalists have generally neglected the role of domestic politics"; see "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," p. 747. I am grateful to Robert Keohane for discussion on this subject.
137. Helen V. Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); Scott C. James and David A. Lake, "The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846," International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Winter 1989), pp. 1-29; and Lars S. Skålnes, "From the Inside Out: NATO Expansion and International Relations Theory," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 44-87. See also Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," p. 295. I think Martin and Simmons are too harsh when they say that "institutionalists have generally neglected the role of domestic politics"; see "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," p. 747. I am grateful to Robert Keohane for discussion on this subject.
138. Helen V. Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); Scott C. James and David A. Lake, "The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846," International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Winter 1989), pp. 1-29; and Lars S. Skålnes, "From the Inside Out: NATO Expansion and International Relations Theory," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 44-87. See also Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," p. 295. I think Martin and Simmons are too harsh when they say that "institutionalists have generally neglected the role of domestic politics"; see "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," p. 747. I am grateful to Robert Keohane for discussion on this subject.
139. Helen V. Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); Scott C. James and David A. Lake, "The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846," International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Winter 1989), pp. 1-29; and Lars S.
140. Helen V. Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); Scott C. James and David A. Lake, "The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846," International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Winter 1989), pp. 1-29; and Lars S. Skålnes, "From the Inside Out: NATO Expansion and International Relations Theory," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 44-87. See also Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," p. 295. I think Martin and Simmons are too harsh when they say that "institutionalists have generally neglected the role of domestic politics"; see "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," p. 747. I am grateful to Robert Keohane for discussion on this subject.
141. Thus my analysis of the Concert of Europe that is based on defensive realism denies or at least ignores the deeper changes that Paul W. Schroeder argues had occurred. See Schroeder, "Did the Congress of Vienna Rest on a Balance of Power?" American Historical Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 (June 1992), pp. 683-706; and Jervis, "A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert," ibid., pp. 716-724. For a fuller presentation of Schroeder's views, see Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
142. Thus my analysis of the Concert of Europe that is based on defensive realism denies or at least ignores the deeper changes that Paul W. Schroeder argues had occurred. See Schroeder, "Did the Congress of Vienna Rest on a Balance of Power?" American Historical Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 (June 1992), pp. 683-706; and Jervis, "A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert," ibid., pp. 716-724. For a fuller presentation of Schroeder's views, see Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
143. Thus my analysis of the Concert of Europe that is based on defensive realism denies or at least ignores the deeper changes that Paul W. Schroeder argues had occurred. See Schroeder, "Did the Congress of Vienna Rest on a Balance of Power?" American Historical Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 (June 1992), pp. 683-706; and Jervis, "A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert," ibid., pp. 716-724. For a fuller presentation of Schroeder's views, see Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
144. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).