Criticality and Environmental Uncertainty in Step-Level Public Goods Dilemmas

Group Dynamics

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 40-61

  Au, Winton ^a  

^a CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; GROUP DYNAMICS; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; MALE; PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE;

EID: 1642344553     PISSN: 10892699     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/1089-2699.8.1.40     Document Type: Article

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