Reciprocity and cooperation in social dilemmas: Review and future directions

Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport

Volumn , Issue , 2019, Pages 315-330

  Komorita, Samuel S ^a   Parks, Craig D ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85079303034     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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