Common Pool Resource (CPR) dilemmas with incomplete information

Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport

Volumn , Issue , 2019, Pages 387-410

  Suleiman, Ramzi ^a   Budescu, David V ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

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Indexed keywords

EID: 85079304824     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (43)

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