A Probabilistic Model of Criticality in a Sequential Public Good Dilemma

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Volumn 75, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 274-293

  Au, Wing Tung ^b   Chen, Xiao Ping ^b   Komorita, S S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0013285998     PISSN: 07495978     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/obhd.1998.2795     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. Budescu D. V., Suleiman, Rapoport A. Positional order and group size effects in resource dilemma with uncertain resources. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 61:1995;225-238.
2. Chen X. P., Au W. T., Komorita S. S. Sequential choice in a step-level public goods dilemma: The effects of criticality and uncertainty. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 69:1996;179-193.
3. Erev I., Rapoport A. Provision of step-level public goods: The sequential contribution mechanism. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 34:1990;401-425.
4. Kerr N. L. Illusions of efficacy: The effects of group size on perceived efficacy in social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 25:1989;287-313.
5. Kerr N. L. Efficacy as a causal and moderating variable in social dilemmas. A social psychological approach to social dilemmas. 1992;Pergamon Press, New York.
6. Komorita, S. S. Parks, C. D. 1994, Social dilemmas, Madison, WI, Brown and Benchmark.
7. McKelvey R. D., Palfrey T. R. Quantal response equilibria for normal form games. Games and Economic Behavior. 10:1995;6-38.
8. Messick D. M., Brewer M. B. Solving social dilemmas: A review. Review of Personality and Social Psychology. 4:1983;11-44.
9. Offerman T., Sonnemans J., Schram A. Value orientations, expectations and voluntary contributions in public goods. The Economic Journal. 106:1996;817-845.
10. Olson M. J. Necessary and sufficient criticality in a minimal cooperating set dilemma: A revised application of prospect theory. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. 1997.
11. Rapoport A. Research paradigms, and expected utility models for the provision of step-level public goods. Psychological Review. 94:1987;74-83.
12. Rapoport A., Erev I. Provision of step-level public goods: Effects of different information structures. Schultz U., Albers W., Mueller U. Social dilemmas and cooperation. 1994;147-172 Springer-Verlag, New York.
13. Rapoport A., Budescu D. V., Suleiman R. Sequential requests from randomly distributed resources. Journal of Mathematical Psychology. 37:1993;241-265.
14. Rutte C. G., Wilke H. A. M., Messick D. M. Scarcity or abundance caused by people or the environment as determinants of behavior in the resource dilemma. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 98:1987;974-1031.
15. Suleiman R. Provision of step-level public goods under uncertainty: A theoretical analysis. Rationality and Society. 9:1997;163-187.
16. Suleiman R., Rapoport A. Provision of Step-level public goods with continuous contribution. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. 5:1992;133-153.
17. van de Kragt A. J. C., Orbell J. M., Dawes R. M. The minimal contributing set as a solution to public goods problems. American Political Science Review. 77:1983;112-122.