Free riders or easy riders?: An examination of the voluntary provision of public radio

Public Choice

Volumn 97, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 587-604

  Brunner, Eric J ^a  

^a SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032263941     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004915126996     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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