Allocating irrigation water: The impact of strategic interactions on the efficiency of rules

European Review of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 305-332

  Faysse, Nicolas ^a  

^a INTERNATIONAL WATER MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE   (South Africa)

Author keywords

Common pool resources; Nash equilibrium; Revelation mechanism; Tunisia; Water allocation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346957019     PISSN: 01651587     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/erae/30.3.305     Document Type: Article

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