The Fisherman's problem: Exploring the tension between cooperative and non-cooperative concepts in a simple game

Journal of Economic Psychology

Volumn 24, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 425-445

  Abbink, Klaus ^a   Darziv, Ron ^b   Gilula, Zohar ^b   Goren, Harel ^b   Irlenbusch, Bernd ^c   Keren, Arnon ^b   Rockenbach, Bettina ^c   Sadrieh, Abdolkarim ^d   Selten, Reinhard ^e   Zamir, Shmuel ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ERFURT   (Germany)

^d TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^e UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Backward induction; Competition; Experimental economics; Game theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 20144376253     PISSN: 01674870     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-4870(03)00014-X     Document Type: Article

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