Choosing rules to govern the commons: A model with evidence from Mexico

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 19-41

  Dayton Johnson, Jeff ^a  

^a DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Common property; D70; Institutional choice; Irrigation; Mexico; O12; O13; O17; Q25; Rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008555783     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00073-1     Document Type: Article

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