Collective action with incomplete commitment: Experimental evidence

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 66, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 829-854

  Schmitt, Pamela ^a   Swope, Kurtis ^a   Walker, James ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034380277     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1061532     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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2. Cornes, Richard, and Todd Sandler. 1986. The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods. New York: Cambridge University Press.
3. Hackett, Steven, Edella Schlager, and James Walker. 1994. The role of communication in resolving commons dilemmas: Experimental evidence with heterogeneous appropriators. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 27:99-126.
4. Isaac, R. Mark, and James Walker. 1991. Costly communication: An experiment in a nested public goods problem. In Contemporary Laboratory Research in Political Economy, edited by Tom Palfrey. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, pp. 269-86.
5. Negri, Donald H. 1989. The common property aquifer as a differential game. Water Resources Research 25:9-15.
6. Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons. New York: Cambridge University Press.
7. Ostrom, Elinor, James Walker, and Roy Gardner. 1992. Covenants with and without a sword: Self governance is possible. American Political Science Review 86:128-45.
8. Ostrom, Elinor, and James Walker. 1991. Communication in a commons: Cooperation without external enforcement. In Contemporary Laboratory Research in Political Economy, edited by Tom Palfrey. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, pp. 287-322.
9. Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James Walker. 1994. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
10. Selten, Reinhard. 1971. A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many. International Journal of Game Theory 2:141-201.