Principals' principles when agents' actions are hidden

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 163-185

  Keser, Claudia ^a   Willinger, Marc ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KARLSRUHE   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITÉ LOUIS PASTEUR   (France)

Author keywords

C91; D82; Experimental economics; Hidden action; Incentives; Measure of predictive success; Principal agent theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034582363     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(99)00038-7     Document Type: Article

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