Discrete-time approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom brownian-motion model of intertemporal incentive provision

Econometrica

Volumn 70, Issue 6, 2002, Pages 2225-2264

  Hellwig, Martin F ^a,b   Schmidt, Klaus M ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Brownian motion; Intertemporal incentive provision; Linear incentive schemes; Principal agent problems

Indexed keywords

BROWNIAN MOVEMENT; COSTS; DISCRETE TIME CONTROL SYSTEMS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PROBABILITY;

INTERTEMPORAL INCENTIVE PROVISION;

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

EID: 0036434065     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00375     Document Type: Article

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