Background beliefs in Bayesian inference

Memory and Cognition

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 179-190

  Evans, Jonathan St B T ^a   Handley, Simon J ^a   Over, David E ^b   Perham, Nicholas ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SUNDERLAND   (United Kingdom)

^c CARDIFF UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BAYES THEOREM; DECISION MAKING; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; PROBABILITY; SCIENCE; SOCIOLOGY; STATISTICAL ANALYSIS;

BAYES THEOREM; CULTURE; DECISION MAKING; HUMANS; JUDGMENT;

EID: 0036275557     PISSN: 0090502X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3758/BF03195279     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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3. Prior beliefs in statistical inference
4. Frequency versus probability formats in statistical word problems
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6. How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats
7. Solving probabilistic and statistical problems: A matter of information structure and question form
8. Physicians ignore base rates, and it matters
9. Heuristics in medical and non-medical decision making
10. Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning
11. Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment
12. On prediction and judgment
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14. On the psychology of prediction
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16. The base rate fallacy reconsidered: Descriptive, normative and methodological challenges
17. Sensitivity to changes in base-rate information
18. Problem structure and the use of base-rate information from experience
19. Everyday base rates (sex stereotypes): Potent and resilient
20. Pseudodiagnosticity in judgment under uncertainty
21. Do frequency frames make probability judgments more coherent?
22. Stalking the elusive "vividness" effect
23. Throwing out the baby with the bathwater? Let's not overstate the overselling of the base rate fallacy
24. Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability