Do Frequency Representations Eliminate Conjunction Effects? An Exercise in Adversarial Collaboration

Psychological Science

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 269-275

  Mellers, Barbara ^a,b   Hertwig, Ralph ^c   Kahneman, Daniel ^c  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; DECISION MAKING; HUMAN; HUMAN RELATION; LANGUAGE; PROBLEM SOLVING; STATISTICAL MODEL; VERBAL BEHAVIOR;

HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; JUDGMENT; LANGUAGE; MODELS, STATISTICAL; PROBLEM SOLVING; VERBAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 0035409518     PISSN: 09567976     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9280.00350     Document Type: Article

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