Agent-based simulation in the study of social dilemmas

Artificial Intelligence Review

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 3-92

  Gotts, N M ^a   Polhill, J G ^a   Law, A N R ^a  

^a SCOTTISH CROP RESEARCH INSTITUTE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Agents; Altruism; Cooperation; Economics; Evolution; Games; Simulation

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; ECONOMICS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

AGENT-BASED SIMULATION; SOCIAL DILEMMAS;

COMPUTER SIMULATION;

EID: 0037373378     PISSN: 02692821     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1022120928602     Document Type: Article

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