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Volumn 198, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 183-195

Win-stay, lose-shift strategies for repeated games - Memory length, aspiration levels and noise

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ASPIRATION; COMPUTER SIMULATION; DECISION MAKING; EVOLUTION; GAME; LEARNING; MEMORY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; REVIEW;

EID: 0033591197     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.1999.0909     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (98)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.