A forgiving strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma

JASSS

Volumn 3, Issue 4, 2000, Pages

  O' Riordan, Colm ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Classical iterated prisoner's dilemma; Cooperation; Game theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 0013356809     PISSN: 14607425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. AXELROD R (1984) Evolution of Cooperation, , Basic Books.
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3. BENDOR, J and Mookherjee D (1987) Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action, American Political Science Review, 81, pages 129-154.
4. DUGATKIN, L.A. (1988) Do Guppies Play TIT FOR TAT during Predator Inspection Visits?, Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 23, pages 395-399.
5. EPSTEIN, J (1997) Zones of Cooperation in Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma, Technical Report, Santa Fe Institute.
6. DUGATKIN, L.A. (1990) N-person Games and the Evolution of Co-operation: A Model Based on Predator Inspection in Fish, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 142, pages 123-135.
7. LOMBARDO, M. (1990) Tree Swallows and TIT FOR TAT: Response to Koenig, Ethology and Sociobiology, 11, pages 521-528.
8. SOBER, E. (1992) Stable Cooperation in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas, Economics and Philosophy, 8, pages 127-139